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ABSTRACT
With the phenomenon of economic globalization having absorbed our attention
for the last decade, environmental challenges as well as the necessity to globally
manage the distribution of resources have been neglected. This paper focuses on
the potential for future resource conflicts among states that – as will be argued -
will be fought along the axis of the consumers and producers of energy.
Conflict over resources can be provoked by the increased energy import
dependency of some Western states, and intensified by an anticipated oil supply
crisis, the effects of which are expected to set in after 2010. The strategies of the
West to prevent and manage this type of conflict - risk reduction, crisis
management and geopolitics of energy - will be evaluated according to their
effectiveness. It will be argued that these strategies might be effective in the
short- and mid term but are inadequate in the long term, and that Western states
cannot depend on them to prevent a conflict over fossil fuels. The focus of the
study is the EU and its precarious strategy of “risk reduction” which, in effect,
places all the eggs in the Russian basket. The discussion of Western crisis
management as implemented by the International Energy Agency also points to
their lack of reliability and effectiveness in managing a severe shortage crisis.
The third strategy to prevent and manage the supply crisis for the West - a
geopolitics of energy – might work in the short run by furnishing Western
states’ control of cheap oil, but is counterproductive in the long run because it
deepens the chasm between them and the producer countries on whose energy
they depend. The only two effective and complementary strategies for avoiding
conflict over resources are the reduction of the dependency on fossil fuels by
developing alternative and renewable energy, and, most of all, the pursuit of a
global policy based on more equitable and controlled energy distribution.
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2. The negligence of “resource wars” in post-Cold War international relations
3. Prospects and causes of oil supply crisis
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3.2. Remaining Reserves and Yet-to-find
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 5 1. Western vulnerabilities and the IEA crisis mechanism
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1. INTRODUCTION1
Following the end of the Cold War, there was a short period of time when it
looked as if the world was entering an era of political stability, enduring peace,
and the absence of conflicts. It was at this time that Francis Fukuyama wrote his
famous book “The End of History and the Last Man”, which announced that the
global spread of capitalism and liberal democracy would bring global prosperity
and peace, even to the third world. Neo-liberal institutionalism, with its
promotion of globalization, gained prominence among international relations
theories, with its promise of the progressive disappearance of conflicts as a
result of the pacifying effects of globalization. It did not take long for this
dream to be shattered: a new wave of ethnic conflicts with unprecedented
dimension and geographical spread brought home the message that domestic
conflict would proliferate rather than decline in the post Cold War era. The
1991 Gulf War, in which three Western powers were directly involved, and the
2003 Western coalitions’ war against Iraq made it more than evident that
interstate war is not a relic of the pre-globalization age. Another dimension has
to be added to explain the dynamics of global security: namely, the present and
future potential for resource wars.
In the following, I will discuss the potential for future resource conflicts
among states that – as will be argued - will be fought along the axis of the
consumers and producers of energy. Conflicts over resources can be provoked
by the increased energy import dependency of the consumer states, and
intensified by production shortages of global fossil fuels, in particular, the most
viable resource: oil. The strategies of the West to prevent and manage this type
of conflict - risk reduction, crisis management and geopolitics of energy - will
be evaluated according to their effectiveness. It will be argued that while they
might work in the short- and mid term, they are inadequate in the long term, and
Western states cannot therefore depend on these strategies to prevent future
conflict over fossil fuels. The discussion focuses on the EU and its strategy of
“risk reduction” vis-à-vis Russia by securing energy supply from one of their
main suppliers through treaties and partnership arrangements. Western crisis
management as implemented by the International Energy Agency also points to
their lack of reliability and effectiveness in managing a severe shortage crisis.
The third strategy to prevent and manage supply crisis for the West - a
geopolitics of energy – might work for a certain region and for a certain
duration by furnishing Western states’ control and access to cheap oil, but is
                                                          
1 An earlier version of this paper was published in Energy Exploration and Exploitation, Vol.21, No.1, 2003. I
would like to thank the European Forum Seminar of the Robert Schuman Center for invaluable comments on an
earlier draft of this paper, in particular Sonia Lucarelli, Mark Pollack and Helen Wallace. I also would like to
thank Giacomo Luciano and Peter Cameron for their detailed comments and for making interesting sources
available to me. Thank you also to the two anonymous reviewers of the RCSAS working paper series.
2counterproductive in the long run because it only serves to deepen the chasm
between themselves and the producer countries on whose energy they depend.
The only two feasible and complementary strategies are the reduction of the
dependency on fossil fuels by developing alternative and renewable energy, and
the pursuit of a more equitable policy of global energy distribution.
In the following, it will be argued that post-Cold War international
relations is characterized by a negligence of “resource wars.” Moreover, it will
be illustrated that renewable resources like minerals and fossil fuels, which are
the traditional objects of resource wars, are excluded from the field of
environmentally caused conflicts. Anticipated shortages in oil production will
be discussed as a further exacerbating factor explaining the potential for
resource conflict. Subsequently, the analysis will focus on new energy supply
vulnerabilities on the part of the EU and its strategy of “risk reduction”, which
will be identified as a precarious strategy since it puts all eggs in the Russian
basket and the suspended Energy Charter Treaty. Also the West’s, more
specifically the OECD’s, inadequate crisis management of the International
Energy Agency will be highlighted, as well as the implications of a Western
geopolitics of energy.
2. THE NEGLIGENCE OF “RESOURCE WARS” IN POST-COLD
WAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The connection between resource and environmental disruption with violent
conflict has been long acknowledged and researched. In particular, the two oil
crises of the 1970s were of utmost concern to Western industrialized societies at
the time, and provoked research on how to prevent future oil supply crises.
Since then, disruptions of energy supplies have been treated as a national
security issue by the Western foreign affairs offices, to be met by the ultimate
means of state force, the military. In international relations, several studies
appeared at this time that put the oil crisis in the context of the North-South
conflict and the South’s demands for a New International Economic Order. This
reflected the Western states’ new awareness for their dependency on the
developing world’s commodities and resources. Studies of this sort discussed
the prospects for armed encounters between North and South in terms of
“politics of scarcity”, “necessity of resource management”, and “the oil
weapon”.2 But interest in this kind of analysis faded after the 1970s for two
reasons: 1) globalization has taken the bite out of the North-South conflict by
smoothing the deep division between developing and developed states, and 2)
after the shock of the two oil crisis of the 1970s, the Western states successfully
                                                          
2 See Arad et al. and, for further references, see the list in Arad et al., p. 205.
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reduced their dependency on the Middle Eastern states by diversifying their
suppliers.
It was, rather, international relation’s subfield of “environmental conflict”
that explained the connection between environmental disruption and violent
conflict.3 Since the end of the 1960s, when “environmental conflict” emerged in
response to the new awareness of environmental issues, the research field has
produced instructive insights into how to prevent conflicts concerning access to
natural resources and clean environment. With its focus on the domestic level of
conflicts, “environmental conflict” has been particularly prone to explain the
massive outbreak of violent ethnic and tribal conflicts that erupted after the end
of the Cold War. But the two major interstate wars of the post-Cold War era, the
1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Western coalition’s occupation of Iraq, which
were also fought for the control of the region’s oil, have been ignored and left
unexplained. In addition, in the field of international relations, research on
interstate conflicts faded in the 1990s. Two developments are responsible for
this trend: 1) economic globalization gave a boost to theories which believe in
the conflict-reducing effects of the globalized economy (such as neo-liberal
institutionalism) and 2) new international relations theories, such as post-
structuralism and Neo-Marxist theories, are not designed to incorporate a
variable such as “resource conflict” if only because they continue social
science’s tradition of not recognizing “nature” as a potential factor for social
action.
In international relations, the classical domain for “interstate wars” has
been realism. With its assumption that conflict and insecurity are constant
features of the international system, it was considered to be the most adequate
theory to explain the Cold War period. However, with the end of the Cold War
and the disappearance of the major threat to the West, realism seemed to be out
of touch with reality, giving way to the establishment of neo-realism as its
successor. However, neo-realism is not offering any analytical framework for
conflict prevention because it expects and explains conflict, but is incapable of
accounting for change. Moreover, with its tenets of realism that states have to
pursue their national interest – if necessary at the expense of morality – neo-
realism rather provides subsequent justifications of “resource wars” than useful
explanations of how to avoid them. Also, at the end of the 1980s, theories with
a focus on the role of economics in international relations seemed more apt to
explain the new reality of an intensified globalization process, giving a boost to
theories belonging to the school of neo-liberalism, such as neo-liberal
institutionalism. These theories are based on the assumption that the global
spread of neo-liberalism would yield greater interdependency among states and
                                                          
3 For a good overview of the field’s development see Deudney, “Environmental Security”.
4make their borders more permeable, thus fostering international cooperation and
world peace. Therefore, in due course, conflict would disappear as a dominant
feature of the international system. Thomas Friedman, in his bestseller on
globalization, explained in more detail how conflicts would be eradicated by the
democratization of technology, finance and information resulting from
economic globalization.4 Fed by the works of classical economists and their
non-recognition of limits, Friedman argues that countries are no longer
“prisoners of their natural resources, geography and history” and therefore can
“choose prosperity”5. Instead, in an era of globalization, a country’s national
wealth is determined by its technology and the forms of its institutions and
investments. Thus, theories promoting globalization and global neo-liberalism
fail to explain violent conflict: in particular, conflict over the distribution of
natural resources.
The current negligence of the notion of “conflict” in post-Cold War
international relations has been further exacerbated by, as Daniel Deudney has
brought to our attention, the rise of theories that continue social science’s
tradition of neglecting nature as a critical factor in social outcomes - in defiance
of three decades of environmental debate.6 As a challenge to the prevalence of
neo-liberal ideas, Neo-Gramscian theories gained new attention and
acknowledgment in the 1990s. As a Marxist approach, Neo-Gramscian theory
has “little regard for the role of natural resources in the economic process”.7
Following Marxists’ belief that “nothing can have value if it is not due to
human labour”8, Neo-Gramscians conclude that materials provided by nature
are free and therefore are of “no value”. Consequently, Neo-Marxists do not pay
much attention to the conflict potential of natural resources or environmental
degradation. Likewise, post-structuralist theories, which gained increasing
recognition in international relations over the last decade, are also not prone to
incorporate any variables relating to environmental scarcity or resource
conflicts. With their “uncompromisingly anti-empirical”9 tenet, post-
structuralists strive to overcome structuralism and emphasize that reality is
socially constructed, that social practices are constructed by humans and are not
themselves natural. But Deudney objects to this notion by arguing that social
practices succeed or fail, not only “because of socially constructed criteria, but
rather because of their ability to function successfully in meeting enduring
human needs in material contexts that are both diverse and shifting.”10
                                                          
4 See Friedman.
5 Friedmann, p. 197. Based on the work of Michael Porter. See Porter, pp. 14-15.
6 See Deudney, “Bringing Nature Back In”.
7 Barbier, p. 19.
8 Quoted in Barbier, p. 19.
9 Rosenau, p. 3
10 Deudney, “Bringing Nature Back In”, p. 50.
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Therefore, in his widely recognized article “Bringing Nature Back In” he pleads
for a “move beyond social-social science, and back to natural-social science.”11
Per definition, the field of “environmental conflict and security” would be
the classical field to cover resource wars.12 As Deudney has shown, in spite of
its “antirealist rhetoric”13, “environmental conflict and security” would be
closest to realism among the international relations theories since it is rooted in
geopolitical and natural realism. In the beginning, “environmental conflict” was
not limited to the concern for the environment but included “extrapolations
from the fears of resource wars”,14 which were developed in the context of the
1970s’ oil crises, the formation of commodity cartels, and rapid price hikes in
natural resources.15
In order to enhance the awareness of environmental problems, researchers
committed to this subject started to advocate to link national security with
environmental issues. This approach kicked off an intensified debate on the
merits of such a link, with neo-realists in particular pleading for excluding
environmental issues from security studies in international relations. The debate
gained new momentum with the end of the Cold War when the military and
security community itself which, in fear of losing significance and legitimacy,
discovered “environmental security” as a useful replacement for the loss of the
major threat to the West. The focus shifted to the Third World as the place
where new risks and threats to Western stability originated, including
environmental degradation and catastrophes. This notion of new security threats
coming from the Third World has been epitomized by Robert Kaplan’s
apocalyptic prophecy of his 1994 article “The coming anarchy” in which he
argued that the defining element of the future world would be anarchy, caused
by environmental scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease. He
concluded that “the environment” is “the national-security issue of the early
twenty-first century.”16 Simon Dalby, who represents the other side of this
polarized debate, argues that “environmental security” can be easily exploited
by the North. By asserting that environmental catastrophes in the South could
spill over and destabilize the Northern states, he claims that the West has a
means to legitimize its constraints and to control Southern development, thus
guaranteeing “that Northern economic interests continue to have access to the
                                                          
11 Ibid, p. 30.
12 Other terms for this field are “environmental degradation” and “environmental scarcity”. In the following,
according to the context “environmental conflict”, “environmental security” and “environmental conflict and
security” will be used interchangeably.
13 Ibid, p. 26
14 Deudney, “Environmental Security”, p. 188.
15 For an insightful debate on the benefits and weaknesses of “environmental conflict” see Gleditsch.
16 Kaplan, p. 58.
6traditional cheap Southern labor and resources.”17 The first Bush administration
seemed to follow the arguments of the advocates of linking environmental
degradation with security and, in 1991, the Department of Defense (DOD) for
the first time included the environment in its National Security Strategy of the
United States.18
In general, “environmental conflict” focussed on renewable resources as
a cause for conflict. But Arthur Westing’s 1986 widely quoted study explicitly
included non-renewable resources as a cause for interstate and intrastate war.
Moreover, of his list of 12 conflicts of the 20th century that all concerned access
to natural resources, more than half were triggered by a dispute over access to
the non-renewable resource oil (7 out of 12), even if indirectly (such as in the
Malvinas case, in which the existence of off-shore oil was assumed rather than
proven).19 Accordingly, Westing concluded:
Global deficiencies and degradation of natural resources, both renewable
and non-renewable, coupled with the uneven distribution of these raw materials,
can lead to unlikely – and thus unstable - alliances, to national rivalries, and, of
course, to war. 20
But Westing seemed to remain an exception, and the field’s tendency to
exclude non-renewable resources from its research intensified in the post-Cold
War era. “Environmental security” was usually defined as referring exclusively
to a depletion and degradation of renewable resources, which are “all prime
components of a nation’s environmental foundations”, such as water, forests,
soil, fisheries and climate.21 Two developments contributed to the exclusion of
the “traditional objects of resource conflicts”22 in “environmental security”: 1)
the first decade of the post-Cold War era experienced a massive wave of ethnic
and tribal conflicts. Tribes and ethnic groups usually do not fight for minerals or
fossil fuels; their life is more affected by the denial of access to fresh water or
fertile soil. Disputes over access to and possession of non-renewable resources
is more the domain of states, because fossil fuels and minerals are necessary
constituents of any war production and can be more easily converted into state
power than, for example, fish and forests. Therefore, environmental security
                                                          
17 Dalby, p. 160.
18 Butts, p. 110.
19 The conflicts range from both world wars to secession, decolonization and civil wars. See Westing, Appendix,
p. 204-210.
20 Westing,. p. 1, emphasis added.
21 Myers, p. 20.
22 Libiszewski, p. 4.
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was encouraged to intensify its focus on the domestic level of conflicts.23 And
2) in view of very low oil prices and an obvious oil surplus, it seemed
inconceivable that a severe oil supply crisis such as that of the 1970s could
repeat itself.
Homer Dixon is one of the leading scholars in the field and his research
reflects these features of the post-Cold War era in an exemplary way. His
research on “environmental scarcity” focuses exclusively on the domestic level
and on renewable sources as causing, at least in part, “a steady increase in the
incidence of violence conflict”24 in the coming decades. His claim that
renewables are crucially different from non-renewables25 is based on the
assumption that there exists an oversupply of non-renewables. He argues that
even if scarcity of non-renewables occurs, it might be only temporary and could
“be overcome without undue hardship in modern economies.”26 As evidence for
this argument, he refers to the decline in prices of metals and minerals in
response to new findings, new technologies in extraction and substitution, and a
reduction in demand by conservation and production efficiencies. Homer Dixon
quotes Robert Repetto to make the point that “(i)n economic terms, exhaustible
resources have not become significantly more scarce over the past century and,
by some measures, most have become less scarce.” 27
Daniel Deudney’s optimistic view that the prospect of resource wars is
very slim is based on his unchallenged confidence in the achievements of
technology for substituting non-renewable resources.28 Moreover, Deudney’s
views demonstrate to what extent this kind of optimism is linked to the ideas of
neo-liberal institutionalism and globalization and their tenet of the positive
effects of capitalism and international trade. Deudney argues that the prevalence
of global capitalism and the intensification of international trade will enhance
the efficiency in resource use, make violent conflicts more costly, and reduce
incentives for territorial conquest. In this way of thinking, there is no space for
the notion of a “non-renewable resource scarcity” that is induced by production
restrictions or depletion. Rather, scarcity is managed successfully by the “robust
character of the world trade system” to such a degree that resource
dependencies are no longer experienced as threats to states. Deudney concludes
as follows, in obvious failure to anticipate the US motivations for its most
recent occupation of Iraq:
                                                          
23 This does not mean that there was not any research relating to the state level, for example, on the effects of
climate change on interstate war. But when interstate war was addressed in “environmental conflict”, it usually
concerned border conflicts between third world countries.
24 Homer-Dixon, p. 4.
25 Ibid, p. 113.
26 Ibid, p. 33. Though he refers explicitly to metal, not to oil.
27 For this argument, Homer-Dixon refers also to the 1992 World Development Report, p. 33.
28 Deudney, “Environmental Security”, p. 206.
8(T)he resource needs of contemporary states are routinely met without territorial
control of the resource source.29
While the ignorance of “resource wars” in the field of “environmental security”
is unconvincing, a decoupling of renewable and non-renewable resources in
research is necessary and justified. Disputes over environmental factors seem to
follow a very different pattern than those concerning fossil fuels, if only for the
fact that they are fought on different levels of societal organizations.
Accordingly there are very different lessons to draw for conflict prevention. A
key variable identified in the analysis of Homer Dixon, for example, is the role
of “ingenuity” as a means to reduce societies’ vulnerability to “environmental
scarcity’s harsh social effects.”30 The “quantity of ingenuity” a society develops
in response to environmental scarcity can play a key role in determining its
ability to adapt to that scarcity. Some of his recommendations for how to
overcome a society’s ingenuity gap might be also applicable to exhaustible
resources, but an incorporation of non-renewable resources in his framework
would require careful analysis and modifications.
Stephan Libiszewski from the Bern ENCOP research group explains why
both forms of resources have to be treated differently and why non-renewable
resources should be excluded from the field of environmental security:
The main fields we think of when we speak about environmental
problems, namely fresh water, soil, forests, air, atmosphere and climate, oceans
and biodiversity, represent all renewable “goods” or “services”. They are
renewable because they are ecologically integrated in a feedback circle system
which guarantees their replacement or the preservation of their quality. Minerals
and fossil fuels, on the other hand which are the traditional objects of resource
conflicts, are non-renewable resources because they are not integrated in such
an ecosystem. Therefore they can be depleted but they cannot be degraded.31
In a response to his critics, Homer Dixon rejects Libiszewski’s
recommendation to restrict the field to the analysis of conflicts caused by
degradation of environmental resources. But, again, only renewables get his
attention, as he argues compellingly that cropland and freshwater also can be
subject to depletion – without using this opportunity to start to address the
field’s problematic exclusion of non-renewables from any analysis.32
                                                          
29 Ibid, p. 205.
30 Homer-Dixon, p. 125.
31 See Libiszewski, p. 4.
32 Schwartz et al., p. 274.
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Thus, the focus on renewable resources in “environmental conflict” at the
expense of non-renewable resources is a logical reflection of the post-Cold War
era, which has been characterized by an oversupply of non-renewable sources as
well as an outbreak of violence mostly below the state level. The downside of
the field’s constriction is obvious: “environmental security and conflict”
focuses exclusively on the underdeveloped third world, while conflicts with
Western involvement are ignored. This applies to the 1991 Gulf War, in which a
resource factor was undeniably involved, as well for the 2003 US-led war
against Iraq, in which the resource component seems to have been one of the
critical factors for provoking it. A debate should begin concerning whether it
makes sense that “environmental conflict” fills this research gap or whether new
subfields should be developed to analyze resource wars and the conditions
which might precipitate such wars in the future.
Not only the most recent occupation of Iraq brought home the message
that non-renewable resources might play a significant role in future violent
conflicts. By the end of the 1990s, new trends emerged that are bringing back
the focus on the interstate level and non-renewable energy as a potential cause
for violent conflicts: ever more experts warn of a future oil supply crisis and an
increasing energy import dependency of some Western states. Therefore, the
notion of “resource wars” should be reintroduced in the research agenda of
international relations To that end, two developments should be encouraged: in
international relations theories, it should be acknowledged that nature is also a
determining factor for human action and social outcome - without being
immediately accused of drifting into Neo-Malthusian waters. The subfield of
“environmental security and conflict” should question its implicit assumption
that violent conflicts are almost exclusively restricted to the domestic level of
third world states or to border disputes among third world states. When
production of oil falls and, considering that on a per capita basis the North uses
nine times as much energy as the South, conflict potential between the almost
exclusively energy-producing states of the South33 and the energy-consuming
states of the North is destined to build.34 Therefore, the assumption has to be
questioned that the North-South conflict – or however we label the gap in
wealth between countries in the North and in the South - is a relic of the pre-
globalization age.35
3. PROSPECTS AND CAUSES OF OIL SUPPLY CRISIS
                                                          
33 With the exception of Russia, which is a major energy producing state but belongs to the North.
34 According to Goldstein, based on 1992 figures, the global South with 76 percent of the world’s population
accounts for only 26 percent of the world’s aggregate energy consumption, Goldstein and Huang, pp. 241-266.
35 One important contribution in this respect is the book of Michael Klare, which encompasses both renewable
and non-renewable sources as motives for conflict, and the state as well as the sub-national level on which these
conflicts are fought.
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Among non-renewable resources, oil is the most important in the economies of
the industrialized countries. It is an extensively used raw material and an
important factor for transport36 and the agricultural sector. The petrochemical
sector would collapse without oil supply and, so far, no replacement is in sight.
In particular, the agricultural sector has become energy-intensive in every
respect: farm machinery depends on diesel fuel or gasoline, fertilizer production
requires natural gas, pesticides and herbicides are synthesized from oil, and
transportation and processing of agricultural products also depend on oil.37 But
with oil prices plunging to record lows during most of the 1990s, there seemed
to be no reason to think about the West’s heavy dependence on its supply.
Moreover, in the 1970s, we all were subject to the alarming predictions of the
Club of Rome’s “Limits of Growth”, which were based on incorrect forecasts in
terms of demand growth and, therefore, misleading.38 However, 30 years later, it
now appears that new problems and crises are on the horizon with respect to
energy supply, and not only with oil, but also with gas – though in a more long-
term perspective. The dramatic increase of oil prices during the last three years -
at one point, by as much as 300% - reflects the shortage of available spare
capacity and the vulnerability of the current supply system. Thus, the question
of how long the oil reserves will last gains new urgency. For an evaluation of
this question, one needs to look both at the demand and the supply side.
While there is much debate with regard to supply, i.e., to what extent and
with what speed the pie is getting smaller, there does not seem to be any
disagreement that demand will increase significantly in the coming decades.
According to the World Energy Outlook of the International Energy Agency,
the most authoritative source for providing forecasts on the outlook of world
energy, demand for oil is expected to rise between 1997 and 2020 at a growth
rate of 1.9% per year. In the developing world, demand will rise three times as
fast as in the developed world, from today’s 43% of total world oil consumption
to 55% by 2020. Most of the demand will come from the transport sector, where
chances for a significant substitution are not yet on the horizon39 But it is on the
demand side where hopes are high to reverse the threatening prospects of an
                                                          
36 Including shipping and aviation.
37 See the insightful chapter by Heinberg, pp. 175-179.
38 Prior to the report, oil use had been growing at around 7% per year, and the calculations of The Club of Rome
assumed that if this growth was going to continue, oil reserves would be exhausted in a surprisingly short time.
Still, many predictions of that time proved correct. See Roger Bentley, “Oil Forecasts, Past and Present”
International Workshop on Oil Depletion, Uppsala, Sweden, May 2002. One notable example is that of Dr.
Hubbert, who predicted that the US would peak as the world’s largest oil producer in the early 1970s. The US
peaked at a daily production of about 9.6 million barrels per day around 1970. Today, the US has dropped to
about 3.4 million barrels per day and imports 60% of its daily petroleum. Still, the US is the third largest oil
producer in the world. See Matthew Simmons, “Depletion and US Energy Policy”, Uppsala Workshop, May
2002.
39 IEA, 2001, p. 35.
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energy crisis by implementing efficient energy saving programs and by
developing commercially profitable alternative energy – at least in the OECD.
The forecasts for the supply side is much more complex and
controversial. Due to the geological condition of fossil fuels, located deep in the
soil, off-shore, and in polar regions, predictions and estimates of the remaining
base of all oil and gas resources are naturally hard to make. Moreover, there is
significant disagreement and confusion among the various forecasts on the
definitions of “reserves”, which makes it even harder to compare them. The
most important swing factor in the forecasts is the category of non-conventional
oil. Non-conventional oil comes from oil shale, tar sands, enhanced recovery,
hostile environments (such as deep or polar water), very small accumulations,
heavy oil, and also comes in the form of Natural Gas Liquids (NGL). Non-
conventional oil is difficult and expensive to extract, and the crucial question
for the future will be to what extent technology will develop to facilitate access
to this non-conventional oil. Some estimates therefore separate these two
categories; others aggregate data of the conventional and unconventional oil.
There are three different parameters by which the degree of depletion of fossil
fuels is estimated.
3.1. R/P Ratio and Peak Production
Most analyses use the category of a global oil “reserves-to-production ratio”
(R/P ratio) to indicate the “theoretical expected lifetime of reserves under
constant production at the current level.”40 This ratio estimates the global R/P
ratio as being enough to provide 40 years of supply at current rates41, thus, any
risk for oil supply is dated well beyond the 40 years. But the R/P ratio is
misleading as an instrument for indicating the years of affordable oil remaining,
since it does not factor in fluctuations either in demand or in production
capacities. In reality, there exists nothing close to a constant production level in
a country, since the past has shown that the production ratios of the main
producer countries have varied greatly over time due to the level of investment
in production infrastructure, the use of new technologies, etc. And even more
importantly, as some scientists argue, depletion of oil does not follow the
pattern of a constant production rate with a sharp decline when the last drops of
oil are extracted. According to the model of the geologist M. King Hubbert, oil
discoveries and oil production follow similar trajectories in the form of a bell
curve with a midpoint of depletion which corresponds approximately to peak
production. Peak production means that half of the world’s finite supply of
conventional oil will have been consumed. After peak production comes
                                                          
40 Luciani, 2002, p. 13.
41 See Bentley, p. 198.
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shortage because production is slowly going to decline, a process we are
witnessing currently for US and North Sea oil production, both of which
reserves have already “peaked”.42
It is this declining production after the midpoint of depletion, “in other
words unsatisfied demand, that is the key factor about future oil supply”43.
Scientists following the Hubbert model of oil production therefore believe that
the assessment of the “midpoint of depletion” is a more valuable indicator for
the time remaining to confront and compensate for the irreversible depletion of
the finite resource oil. There is considerable disagreement about when this peak
occurs, but according to Giacomo Luciani “(n)evertheless the reality of a global
peak is not under discussion: production has been declining for many years now
in the United States, and is expected to soon decline in the North Sea.”44
According to an international group of petroleum specialists (Association for
the Study of Pea Oil, ASPO), the world supply of oil will peak as early as 2010,
provoking soaring energy prices and economic upheaval. 45
3.2. Remaining Reserves and Yet-to-find
The forecast for the peak of production depends on the estimates of the
remaining and yet-to-find reserves of conventional and non-conventional
resources, which is a third category that indicates the process of depletion.
There is no disagreement that so far 1700 Gb of oil have been found in the
world. Moreover, most of the more than 60 estimates that have been made in
recent decades indicate that the total ultimately recoverable quantity of
conventional oil would be somewhere around 2000 Gb 46 However, there are
authoritative estimates that deviate grossly from this average. In a 2000 study,
the US Geological Survey delivered a considerably higher figure. The USGS
estimated that, with a 50% probability, the world’s remaining oil would add up
to 2300 Gb, with a 95% probability to 2100 Gb and with a 5% probability to
2800 Gb. In a second analysis, the USGS included the factor of “reserve
growth”, based on the US experience in which (by applying new technology
and methods) more oil than expected could be pumped.47 The USGS then
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assigned probabilities to these “reserve growths.” With the inclusion of this new
category, the study arrived at gigantic “headline” ultimate reserves of 2300 Gb
with a 95% probability, 3000 Gb with a 50% probability, and 4000 Gb with a
5% probability.
A key factor responsible for the substantial variations in these studies is
different expectations of how much oil is yet-to-find. Expectations of the
remaining undiscovered reserves depend on interpretations of past discovery
patterns, from which scientists extrapolate future discovery trends. But even
past discovery trends are read differently by geologists and oil experts. ASPO
scientists argue that the big discoveries have all been made. According to their
interpretation, the peak of discovery occurred in the 1960s and the discovery
rate has fallen dramatically in the last 35 years, now averaging about 10 Gb/yr.48
This finding has recently been confirmed by oil company executive, Harry
Longwell, Director of Exxon Mobile49. On this basis, ASPO member Colin
Campbell estimates a yet-to-find figure of 130 Gb. At the other extreme, the
USGS forecasts three times more than ASPO, projecting an average of 30 Gb
found oil per year. Their study suggests that, with a 50% probability, another
732 Gb will be found between 1995 and 2020, assuming that US know-how is
applied in the rest of the world.
One of the reasons for the surprising differences of interpretation in past
discovery trends is distortion in the reporting of proven reserves, which are
published unquestioned and unchanged year after year by the BP Statistical
Review. While it is widely believed that BP provides its own estimates, it
merely reports Oil & Gas Journal non-backdated reserves as reported by
governments. Assessments of reserves are subject to diverse political
motivations to understate or overstate the quantities involved. In the 1980s,
several OPEC countries reported considerable increases in reserves, which
misled oil experts into believing that we “are running into oil”.50 But this
sudden “reserve growth” was not caused by changes in the OPEC countries’
reservoirs, but rather by a “quota war” among several OPEC members, because
production quota depends on the quantity of the reserve base.51 It started with
Iraq, when it added an eleven billion barrel increase that in fact was a delayed
report of a discovery in the late 1970s. Venezuela followed by doubling its
reserves in 1987 by the admission of, at that point, large amounts of heavy oil it
had found long before. Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and later Saudi Arabia felt
compelled to counteract Venezuela’s action by reporting huge increases of their
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own, practically overnight. The actual figures might be somewhere in the
middle, because the old numbers (provided by the companies before being
expropriated) could be understated. Moreover, it is implausible that a large and
increasing number of countries report unchanged numbers year after year
although “production eats into reserves.” More than half of all countries with
reserves reported by the Oil and Gas Journal and hence also by the BP
Statistical Review are not generally reporting reserves changes.52
In order not to lose orientation in this jungle of polarized figures,
governments and institutions tend to rely on the energy estimate of the
International Energy Agency (IEA) and its annual World Energy Outlook. In
1998, the World Energy Outlook for the first time launched a warning that soon
there might be an oil supply problem. For the year 2020, the report estimated a
total oil demand for 111.5 million barrels per day, which is juxtaposed to 92.3
million barrels a day of world oil supply. Thus, global demand would have a
deficit of 19.2 million barrels a day in 2020. These missing barrels of oil were
then miraculously matched by a category labeled “Unidentified Unconventional
Oil”, declared at 19.1 million barrels a day and just compensating for the deficit
between supply and demand. As a consequence of this analysis, the report
estimated that the peak of conventional oil production might arrive before
2020.53 These data have been understood as a message by some IEA agents to
their client states that there might be soon a problem. But the IEA staff member
in charge of this part of the report, J. M. Bourdaire, left the IEA shortly
thereafter, and with the publication of the upbeat 2000 USGS report, subsequent
annual IEA reports are again much more optimistic.54 The IEA 2002 report
starts from the assumption of “ample” oil resources, though it also warns that
“more reserves will need to be identified in order to meet rising oil demand to
2030.”55
However, it is obviously not necessary to start from the assumption of a
progressive decline of the oil resource base in order to foresee serious problems
with future oil supply. An independent task force, set up in late 2000 by the
Baker Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations on the “Strategic Energy
Challenges for the 21st Century”, comes up with an alarming analysis:
As the 21st century opens, the energy sector is in critical condition. A crisis could erupt
at any time from any number of factors and would inevitably affect every country in
today’s globalized world. While the origins of a crisis are hard to pinpoint, it is clear
that energy disruptions could have a potentially enormous impact on the US and the
                                                          
52 Bentley, 2002, p. 197.
53 International Energy Agency, 1998, p. 101.
54 David LaGesse, US News & World Report, September 17, 2001.
55 International Energy Agency, 2002, p. 29.
15
world economy, and would affect US national security and foreign policy in dramatic
ways. 56
According to the authors of the report, this dramatic “energy challenge” has
nothing do with the global hydrocarbon resource base, which they believe is
still “enormous”. Rather, it is prompted by energy infrastructure constraints
combined with strong economic and oil-demand growth. First, too-rapid
economic growth during the past has surpassed the production capacity of the
oil and gas producers, rendering them incapable to keep up with increasing
global demand. Second, for the last two decades the most important energy
producers refrained from investing in production infrastructure due to the
falling real prices for oil. Furthermore, the report identifies as a cause for this
looming supply crisis a lack of trained energy sector workers and – with an eye
to the more special US situation – the consequences of energy market
deregulation and market liberalization. While the report’s authors are aware that
“American people continue to demand plentiful and cheap energy without
sacrifice or inconvenience,”57 they also point out the reality that neither
emerging new technologies or the necessary surplus energy capacity is on the
horizon to meet such demands. Many of the independent task force’s
recommendations have been incorporated in the “National Energy Policy”, a
May 2001 governmental study on the state of affairs of US energy policy.
During the last few years, experts of the oil industry have joined the camp
of those who warn of a supply crisis in the foreseeable future. This includes
Franco Bernabé from ENI (the Italian energy company),58 as well as the chief
executive of ARCO, Michael Bowlin, who declared in February 1999: “We’ve
embarked on the beginning of the last days of the age of oil”.59 Also BP’s new
corporate name “Beyond Petroleum” acknowledges that there will be a problem
of oil supply in the future.60 And Exxon Mobile’s Harry Longwell puts it as
follows:
The catch is that while demand increases, existing production declines. To put a
number on it, we expect that by 2010 about half the daily volume needed to meet
projected demand is not on production today – and that’s the challenge facing
producers.61
According to those who warn of a supply crisis but don’t see it caused by a
dwindling resource base, the challenge is to develop the technology to exploit
existing fields more sufficiently and to extract the reserves of unconventional
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oil in a commercially profitable fashion. This is the central point on which the
debate will center in the future. But here comes the downside: if oil companies
are to replace the output lost from aging fields and meet the world’s ever rising
demand for oil, the IEA reckons they must invest $1 trillion in non-OPEC
countries over the next decade alone. But it is more than questionable whether
technology can really succeed in increasing the discovery rate to the extent
necessary to satisfy demand. The fact of the matter is that for every two barrels
used, only one new one is found.62
The extent to which conservation strategies and the substitution of oil can
compensate for the decline in oil production, and the time frame in which they
may do so, is very hard to assess.63 Some promising progress has been made, in
particular with the replacement of oil with natural gas. The share of gas in
generating electricity and heating is constantly increasing. But since gas is a
finite resource, the replacement of oil with gas will not solve the problem but
only “buy time” for a switch to renewable sources. New energy extractions (for
example, from wind turbines and solar power) have made considerable
progress, but in view of the investment and technology needed to turn them into
a profitable energy sector, it will still take decades before renewables will
constitute a considerable share of the energy mix. In any case, the biggest
problem remains with transportation, where all hopes rest on the development
of fuel cells produced from hydrogen. However, to turn fuel cells in a universal
battery for transportation applications requires an entirely different energy
infrastructure and a “transition to a hydrogen economy”64. Moreover, it is a
problem that the production of hydrogen currently relies mainly on natural gas.
Thus, the production of the fuel cell will also eat into the dwindling gas
reserves.
The ASPO scientists stress that there is no reason to panic and that there
is time left to counter this looming supply crisis:
The World is not about to run out of oil. At peak, there is as much left as
we have used so far, but we do need the high supply, while it lasts, to achieve
an orderly transition.65
But there are no sings of serious preparations for an orderly transition.
With demand progressively surpassing production over the next decades, we
can expect a fight over the distribution of the remaining resources, with the
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South no longer prepared to accept the existing disproportional consumption of
energy.
4. EU ENERGY SUPPLY: NEW VULNERABILITIES, RISKY
STRATEGIES
While the question of when and how the oil supply crisis will hit the world is a
controversial subject and debated heatedly in expert circles, there is no
controversy about the increasing import dependency of some Western states.
This new vulnerability, which carries the potential for inter-state resource
conflicts, refers not only to oil, but also includes gas. On one hand, gas poses
less of a potential supply problem for the Western world than oil, since it will
take longer for gas supplies to run out. On the other hand, there are two
problems related to increasing reliance upon gas as a primary energy supply: 1)
while there exists a mechanism for dealing with interruptions in oil supplies,
there is no equivalent mechanism for gas at the EU level or, more widely, in the
IEA framework66 and 2) there is a fundamental difference between oil and gas:
gas, unless it has been transformed into liquid gas (LNG), can only be
transported by pipelines directly to its customers and therefore requires long-
term contracts between producers and consumers. In contrast to gas, oil only
needs pipelines to be transported to transshipment points where it is loaded on
ships for delivery to distant markets. This means that while there is a global
market for oil, the corresponding market for gas is only regional. Should a crisis
occur with the main suppliers, the options for diversification are therefore very
limited.
Although the EU has been strongly in need of external energy resources,
it started only in the mid 1990s to advance its own analysis and strategies to
deal with potential supply crisis. After a short presentation of new EU energy
vulnerabilities, the effectiveness of the EU strategy of “risk reduction” vis-à-vis
Russia will be discussed in detail.
4.1. EU Energy Supply Vulnerabilities
Most energy policy is still made at the level of the EU member states and so far
the EU Commission has failed in its goal to achieve formal competence for a
Common Energy Policy (CEP). To boost the case for a CEP, the Commission
has launched a series of papers starting with a Green Paper in 1995. It outlined
the main foundations of such a policy, including the promotion of an Internal
Energy Market, a common security of supply policy, and the consideration of
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environmental aspects. Several other studies followed. In particular, the 2000
study “Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply” is
regarded as the key EU document in this context.
Oil Import Reliance
Europe’s oil import dependency will increase drastically in the mid-term future
since North Sea crude oil production is projected to decline progressively after
having reached peak production around 2000. Currently, in the EU, energy
demand is covered by 41% oil, 22% gas, 16% coal, 15% nuclear energy and 6%
renewables.67 The EU currently imports 76% of its oil energy requirements; by
2020, this is projected to increase to 90%. The Green Paper acknowledges that
“geographic diversification” will be difficult in view of the fact that the
remaining oil reserves will increasingly be concentrated in the Middle East.68
According to data presented by a EU document, in 1999 the EU imported 51%
of its oil from OPEC countries, with 31% from the Middle East, 18% from
Africa, and 2% from Venezuela. Among the Non-OPEC countries the EU was
supplied with 21% from Norway, 18% form Russia69 plus the CIS and 10%
from Mexico and others.70 Thus, expressed in countries, Norway is the No.1 oil
supplier for the EU, Russia the No.2.
Gas Import Reliance
Natural gas has seen a rapid growth in consumption since the 1990s,
increasingly supplanting oil for heating. In the mix of energy, the share of gas--
currently 22%--will increase to 29% by 2030. The EU imports 40% of its gas
consumption; of that amount, Russia and the CIS account for 41% of the EU’s
gas imports, Algeria 29% and Norway 25%.71 Thus, for the foreseeable future,
Russia and Algeria will remain the main external suppliers. The Green paper
concludes: “In the long run, the supply of gas in Europe risks creating a new
situation of dependence.” 72
In view of the geography of its suppliers, for the EU and the increasing
dimension of its import dependency, the 1999 Annual Energy Review’s
conclusion warns that more than three quarters of world oil and gas reserves are
located in potentially unstable areas from political and/or economic point of
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views. Furthermore these areas will remain the dominant source of European
Union supplies in the future.73
The 2000 Green paper also discusses the potential instabilities in
connection with the EU’s reliance on a few energy suppliers:
Adopting a policy of geopolitical diversification has not been able to
free the Union from effective dependence on the Middle East (for oil) and
Russia (for natural gas). Indeed, a number of Member States, and in
particular the applicant countries, are entirely dependent on a single gas
pipeline that links them to a single supplier country. 74
Diversification and Technology
Diversification of suppliers, in particular in the gas sector, is therefore one
important strategy recommended by the Commission. Towards this end, the EU
- in its 1995 Green paper – declared its intention to develop and apply new
technologies for enhanced exploitation of fossil fuels as well as make better use
of new and renewable energy sources.75 But five years later, in 2000,
renewables still accounted for only 6% of Europe’s supply, including 2%
hydroelectricity.76 Moreover, the progress made in renewables has been offset
by a further increase in consumption. Accordingly, the Commission set a new
goal: it projected the target of doubling the share of renewables in global energy
consumption from 6% in 1997 to 12% by 2010, a level of 7% for biofuels by
2010, and a target of 20% for all fuel substitutes. The investment required to
meet these goals has been estimated to be about 165 billion Euros between 1997
and 2010. 77
The 2000 EU Green paper states that “transport represents the great
unknown for the future of energy” and that, with its “almost complete
dependence on oil”, it is “an Achilles’ heel for Europe’s economy”.78 In the
future, the transport sector is expected to grow by 2% per annum, with goods
transport expected to increase by 38% and passenger transport by 19%. The EU
concedes that the current absence of any real oil substitute (bio-fuels, natural
gas) in the transport sector would “make any prolonged oil crisis critical”.79 But
the transport sector is not the only problem: while the EU paper correctly
                                                          
73 1999 EU Annual Energy Review, p. 75.
74 EU Commission, Green Paper, 2000, p. 22.
75 EU Commission, Green Paper, 1995, p. 39.
76 EU Commission, Green Paper, 2000, p. 46.
77 Ibid, p. 48.
78 Ibid, p. 6 Annex.
79 Ibid, p. 43.
20
acknowledges that energy savings in transport is a sine qua non for any
substantial reduction in energy consumption, it completely omits the problem of
the petrochemical and agricultural sectors, which are both heavily dependent on
oil and where no short-term solutions – except controversial ones like genetic
engineering - are in sight.
The 2000 EU Green paper has been criticized widely for its critical
shortcomings.80 One criticism refers to the lack of the paper’s engagement in the
current controversial debate on resource depletion.81 Furthermore, instead of
acknowledging the structural dimension of this problem in terms of the
necessity to prepare for the inevitable long-term shift to a system depended on
renewable energy, the Commission reduces the problem to one of “import
dependency”.82 As stated explicitly in the Green paper, the EU is not seeking to
increase energy self-sufficiency or to decrease its dependence, but instead
deliberately limits itself to a strategy of reducing “the risks linked to such
dependency”.83 This approach is labeled here as the “EU strategy of risk
reduction.”
Independent of the strategy, the analysts who drafted the EU Green paper
at least cannot be accused of underestimating the seriousness of the situation
when they use the following analogy to describe the social risks of an energy
crisis:
The instability of energy supplies, whether linked to erratic
fluctuations in prices, relations with producer countries or a chance event,
may cause serious social disruption. Today petrol is vital for the functioning
of the economy, like bread. Any disruption of supply is likely to lead to social
demands, if not social conflict. The situation is similar to that created by a
bread shortage 200 years ago. 84
The Energy Charter Treaty and the most recent Energy Partnership with
Russia have to be seen as a reflection and direct policy outcome of this strategy
aimed at reducing the risk for an EU involved in high import dependency on
Russia. But both policy initiatives, the Charter Treaty and the Energy
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Partnership, fall short of guaranteeing energy delivery from the EU’s most
important gas and second-most important oil supplier.
4.2. The Risky Strategy of “Risk Reduction”: Putting all Eggs in the
Russian Basket
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) belongs in the category of EU strategies of
risk reduction; its aim is to secure energy supply through contractual and legal
instruments. The Charter was set in motion by the Dutch government in 1990 to
stimulate economic growth in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The
Charter was signed as a political declaration in 1991 and developed into the
Energy Charter Treaty, signed in 1994. The signatories to the treaty, now
totaling 51, include all members of the European Union, several Eastern
European countries, Russia and the CIS states, plus Australia and Japan. The
Treaty entered into force in 1998 following the ratification of 30 signatories
(ratification for other countries is still pending). The purpose of the treaty is to
establish legal rights with respect to investment, trade, and the transit of energy.
But the most important issue is security of transit, with all signatories obliged to
allow the transit of energy from third parties including in the event of a conflict
with one of the parties. This issue was raised in view of the fact that Russian
gas, for example, is transported via Ukraine and other republics that have
potential or actual conflict with Russia.
But so far Russia has not ratified the ETC, nor would it appear that the
Russian parliament intends to ratify the treaty in the foreseeable future.85 Thus
the implementation of the ETC has been suspended indefinitely. The
explanation for the Soviet reluctance to commit to this treaty is due to the transit
protocols, which would require the signatories to allow third countries to use
their pipelines for transit of their energy goods. However, Russia is not willing
to allow third countries such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to use Russian
territory for transit, as it wishes to protect the monopoly position of the Russian
gas company, Gazprom, in the European gas market. It is widely held amongst
energy experts that “maintaining a stronghold over energy transit possibilities
for former Soviet states has been a foreign policy instrument the Russian
government has been reticent to relinquish.”86
In order to partially compensate for the lack of Russian participation in
the ECT, the EU succeeded in achieving an “energy partnership” with Russia.
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This initiative has been launched as one policy outcome of the EU Green Paper
stipulating that the EU’s share of Russia’s current gas and oil supply is planned
to double in the next 20 years.87 But experts warn that Russia will not be
capable of reliably delivering energy in these quantities in view of its limited
reserves, its high domestic demand and the moderate production capacity of its
energy companies.
Limited Reserves
While Russia is undisputedly the third largest oil producer and the second
largest oil exporter, the quantity of its reserves is seen very differently. In its
2000 “Russian Energy Strategy”, the Russian government claimed to possess 12
to 13% of world oil reserves (including possible reserves), while Western
estimates assume proven reserves in Russia of less than 50 billion barrels or
4.6% of world reserves.88 But recent increases in oil output are not necessarily a
reflection of vast reserves; they can be understood as no more than a short-term
improvement generated by the reactivation of inactive wells, drilling
improvements, and the exploitation of some new fields. Experts point to the
aging oil fields in Siberia, which show no evidence of any potential growth in
production. Neither are there expectations of new findings in Russia, apart from
the Sakhalin Island, the Northern Seas and some Russian fields in the Caspian.89
Even according to the Russian Energy Strategy, oil production increase will be
no more than about 1% per annum. Friedmann Müller concludes:
If all these factors are compared with the access to production capacities of Middle
East countries in the range of more than 4 million barrels per day, the Russian
ability to operate as a swing supplier and alternative to Middle East oil is non-
existent and will not develop in the future.90
As a result, even the big oil companies like LUKoil, YUKOS and TNK are
investing in the gas sector. Hill and Fee note that “Russia is to gas what Saudi-
Arabia is to oil.”91 It seems that Russia’s gas reserves far exceed those of any
other country, holding 32% of proven total world reserves and outranking Iran,
Qatar, Saudi-Arabia and Untied Arab Emirates as well as the US and Algeria.
Accounting for 41% of EU gas imports, Russia and the CIS is the EU’s biggest
gas supplier.92 Since 1997, Russia has also been the main supplier for Turkey,
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accounting for about 70% of its gas imports. North East Asia is also seen as a
prospective market for Russian gas. In particular China, Japan, and South Korea
are interested in importing gas from Russia. Gazprom, Russia’s main gas
company, concluded deals with three of China’s largest energy companies and
proposed several options to construct overland pipeline routes for transporting
Russian gas to China, and possibly to South Korea and Japan.
However, there is still a question concerning whether the reserves will
enable these ambitious plans to be met. Gazprom’s gas production has
decreased slightly over the last few years in response to the aging of the
Western Siberian gas fields, which in 2000 accounted for 80% of Russian
output. However, there is no escape from the fact that by 2010, or by the latest
2015, there will be a significant decrease in West Siberian production, exactly
at the time when import dependency on Europe will grow.93 While there are
large offshore fields in the Barents Sea and the Yamal Half Island, it is more
than questionable whether they will generate enough profit to justify the
construction of a pipeline system. Technically, the development of these
offshore fields in the Arctic North of Russia is going to be very difficult
because of the cold temperatures, darkness in the Arctic Winter, a water depth
of 280-360 meters, ice, and waves with a height of 25 meters.94 For the
exploitation of these reserves, the construction of a section of the Yamal
pipeline is indispensable, but the profitability of such a pipeline is questionable.
This means that, given the potential Russian delivery capacity –(according to
the estimates of the Russian Energy Strategy), 90% of overall Russian exports
would be spent by the agreed quantity of exports to Europe alone.95 A further
unknown is Russia’s high domestic demand for gas and oil. The Russian Energy
Strategy assumes that in this domain considerable savings are possible. But it is
unclear upon what kind of prospects the Energy Strategy bases its optimistic
outlook, in particular with regard to the expected economic growth in Russia
that will lead to a further demand increase for energy.
A further strategy for Gazprom to meet its export and domestic delivery
demands is to access additional gas reserves in Central Asia, i.e. Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. But for such a strategy to be implemented, it
would be necessary for Russia to place its pipeline system at the disposal of gas
producers of the Caspian region. A step in this direction has been advanced by
Putin’s recent call for a Eurasian alliance of gas producers, including Russia,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. While this alliance would allow the
Central Asian countries to use the Russian pipeline system, in contrast to the
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arrangements under the suspended ETC, it would at the same time secure
Russian control of the quantity, direction, and conditions of the gas transport.
Optimism that Russian energy production may increase has been nurtured
by Western investment in the Russian energy sector in an effort to increase
production capacity. As early as 1995, the Russian government introduced
production sharing agreements (PSAs) as a means to facilitate foreign
companies’ investment in its energy sector. But with the rise of oil prices, the
Russian companies’ and government’s reluctance to share the Russian reserves
with foreign investors grew. This growing resistance to Western investment is
expressed in the indefinite Russian suspension of the ratification of the Energy
Charter, the implementation of which would provide Western companies with
the security necessary to guarantee large-scale investments. Nor is there any
progress in the completion of the legal framework for production sharing
agreements.96 As Hill and Fee put it: “Russia’s oil industry executives see
themselves taking over Western business in the next 10-15 years – not letting
Western firms break further into Russian oil.”97 Luciani confirms this
observation in stating that Russia – like Saudi Arabia –discovered that the oil
sector is an essential component of national sovereignty and should be reserved
for national oil companies, with the exception of the more difficult and less
promising field.98
Energy Companies as Foreign Policy Tools
While it seems doubtful that Russian energy companies will be capable of
meeting their delivery commitments to Europe in the long term, there is a
question concerning the extent to which these companies can be exploited for
the pursuit of Russian foreign policy. On the one hand it has been argued that
the oil companies are to a large extent privatized and have become transformed
into competitive international corporations – and therefore companies like
YUKOS99 and LUKoil are expected to resist any attempt by the Russian
government to instrumentalize them in any way. Moreover, in view of the
nature of the Russian economic and political system during the transition
period, the Russian state would be “too enmeshed in domestic rent-allocation to
be able to think through a long-term policy” for exploiting energy for foreign
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policy goals.100 On the other hand Hill and Fee argue that energy and energy
companies are “important tools for the State in promoting Russian foreign
policy”. They give evidence for a “creeping re-nationalization of the sector”101
initiated by President Putin at the beginning of his presidency. In the first place,
the structure of the state dominated energy sector was not affected by the break
up of the Russian oil industry in 1993. The government maintains majority
control in the cases of the oil companies Rosneft (100%) and Slaveft (50%), and
some control in Eastern Oil Co. and LUKoil (37% and 14% respectively). But
the quantity of the government’s share does not fully reflect the companies’
relation with the state, and companies with high government shares still strive
for independence, while other companies with a low share, such as Zarubezneft,
are closely following the government’s directives. Although the two (largely)
private oil companies - YUKOS and LUKoil - pursue market oriented strategies
in an attempt to become competitive in the international market, they are still
strongly influenced by the state. Both Presidents of LUKoil and YUKOS are
former state officials and became involved in the energy industry only with
government approval. Vagit Alekperov, the President of LUKoil, explicitly
advertises the constructive role energy companies can play in Russian foreign
policy.102
As for Gazprom, the close relationship with the state is even more
obvious, although the government only holds 38% of the shares. After Putin lost
partial control of Gazprom at the beginning of his presidency, the appointment
of a young Putin protégé from St. Petersburg, Alexei Miller, as Gazprom’s
chairman in May 2001 is seen as evidence that Putin had won out in his power
struggle with Gazprom managers, whose aim was to privatize the gas company.
European gas companies - ENI as well as Wintershall and Ruhrgas – started to
invest in this large gas company which holds 25% of world gas reserves and
controls 90% of Russian gas production. The participation of European energy
companies in Gazprom might serve as a further guarantee that Russian gas
deliveries to Europe will flow without interruptions. But these first initiatives of
Western investment in the Russian gas industry might already be in retreat. The
Western companies lack guarantees for their investment and production sharing
agreements. Wintershall withdrew from a major Gazprom-Rosneft joint venture
in early 2002. It is also questionable whether companies like Ruhrgas, which
holds only a 5% share of Gazprom and another 1.5% through a joint venture
                                                          
100 Balmaceda, 2002, p. 7. See also Sahm and Westphal who argue that Gazprom “enjoys a great deal of
autonomy because it has immunized itself against state interventions during the struggle of restructuring the
natural monopolies.” See Sahm and Westphal, p. 283.
101 Hill and Fee, p. 4.
102 In a newspaper interview, he explained the effects of the expansion and investment of the Russian oil industry
in the CIS states and Eastern Europe: “As an example I am certain that Bulgaria whose oil sector is almost
entirely owned by Russian companies, will not conduct any anti-Russian foreign policy in the foreseeable future.”
Quoted in Hill and Fee, p. 20.
26
with a Gaszprom subsidiary, would attain “veto” power in case of conflict with
the Gazprom management. Thus, it would appear that with the re-
nationalization of its energy sector, it is questionable whether the Russian
energy companies would be willing or powerful enough to resist a call by the
Russian government to support certain foreign policy goals. Moreover, the
creation of the Eurasian gas alliance could be interpreted as an enlargement of
Russian foreign policy options: while Putin’s intention might be primarily to
bring stability into the gas transportation system, these gas producers could
exploit the alliance for prize agreements or the achievement of common foreign
policy goals vis-à-vis their customers, in short as a kind of gas OPEC.103
In view of its high dependency on energy imports from Russia, security
of supply is a critical issue in EU-Russian relations. Over the last 30 years,
Russia has been the most reliable supplier of energy for the European Union –
there has never been any interruption of supplies.104 Long-term “take or pay”
contracts help guarantee Russian gas delivery and ensure the necessary funding
for large-scale investments in production and transportation infrastructure. But
it must be tempting for a Russian government to use this new power for Russian
interests – or at least to threaten to consider this. During a recent visit to
Germany, President Putin transformed this remote theoretical possibility into a
real and specific one when he did not shy away from playing energy supply
against Russia’s integration into European institutions. He let the Europeans
know unambiguously:
If Europe treats Russia as an alien type, then of course we could create
obstacles on the path of expansion of these relations. However, if Europe
treats Russia as an equal partner, for Russia the rules will not be applied
according to which a EU country is not allowed to be supplied with more
than 30% energy from a country, which is not member of this community.105
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The implication is that if Russia is left unsatisfied with the degree of its
integration into EU institutions, it will consider withholding energy supplies to
Europe. Thus, it seems, the EU strategy of risk reduction by pursuing the
Energy Charter Treaty turned out to be a deadlock and the Energy dialogue is
no guarantee to prevent conflict over resources by the interruption of supplies
from Russia – be it intentionally, by using the “oil” or “gas” weapon, or be it
unintentionally, caused by a progressive depletion of Russian energy resources
and the increasing number of consumers who are dependent on Russia.
5. INADEQUATE WESTERN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
In this section of the paper, we will discuss the efficiency and the implications
of Western strategies of crisis management to respond to this energy
vulnerability, namely the potential use of emergency measures in the context of
the International Energy Agency, and a Western strategy of a geopolitics of
energy.
5.1. Crisis Scenarios and Crisis Management: the IEA
Disturbances and supply crisis have always been part of the global petroleum
system. But a system of crisis management was installed in the 1970s as a direct
outcome of the most dramatic supply interruption, the 1973 oil crisis. In the
following, it will be discussed to what extent an “oil crisis” similar to that of the
1970s can still affect today’s petroleum system, and how effective the crisis
management system of the International Energy Agency (IEA) has been so far
in dealing with supply interruptions.
Crisis Before the 1970s
Before World War II, it was mainly national and labour struggles in Latin
America and the Middle East that caused disturbances to the Western oil
companies. After World War II, two major events occurred in the 1950s: first,
the nationalization of the British oil corporations through the Mossadeq regime,
and the subsequent coup by British and US forces to overthrow Mossadeq and
to install the pro-Western Shah (1951-54). The second was the oil supply crisis
that occurred in the Suez crisis in 1957. Well into the 1960s, the US hegemony
of the world petroleum system was based on the United States’ role as an oil
producer. Therefore, in case of disruptions in oil supply – for example, in the
Suez Canal crisis – the US still had the excess capacity to act as a swing
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producer that enabled it to increase output and export to its oil-consuming allies
in Western Europe and Japan. But US production peaked during the late 60s
and this decline in its production capacity became obvious during the first “oil
crisis” in 1973, when the US proved unable to supply the market with additional
excess oil.
Crisis of the 1970s
For the first time in the late 1960s and 1970s, oil-producing countries made use
of the “oil weapon” as an instrument for foreign policy. The West’s first
encounter with this new phenomenon occurred when an oil embargo was
imposed by the OAPEC106 on the United States and the Netherlands for their
support of Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. There was a reduction of 5
million barrels per day (mb/d) in supplies from the Arab countries of OAPEC
between September and November, which resulting in a loss amounting to 9%
of the total production of 50.8 mb/d.107 Prices of oil rose by 227%, from $5.12
in October 1973 to $ 11.65 by January 1974.108 However, this first oil crisis was
not provoked solely by the Arabs using the oil weapon, but rather by spare
capacity that had been consumed.109 Oil was under-priced, stimulating a very
fast demand growth, which again eroded the spare capacity to the point where it
was no longer guaranteed that the system was capable of keeping up with
demand. For this reason, it was advantageous for the petroleum system to
correct the oil price upward. What happened in 1973 was that “the importance
of the underlying market tightness was subsumed under the headlines of the war
with Israel and the unsheathing of the Arab ‘oil weapon’.”110 The spectacular
1973 crisis was followed by the crisis in 1979, and a third one in September
1980, when Iraq declared war on Iran. The deficit this time was 4 - 5% with a
261% increase in price from $13 to $34 per barrel.111 While there is consensus
among analysts and scholars that the first oil shock had severe economic and
political effects, there is disagreement concerning the extent of these effects. It
is doubtful that it was solely the rise in oil prices that “led to the worst recession
in decades in the trilateral countries”, as the Trilateral Commission claims.112
Capitalism was also experiencing a severe structural crisis at this time. But the
strong relationship between oil price shocks and recession cannot be denied.
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One response of the Western countries to these crises of the 1970s was
diversification strategies. The industry stepped up their exploration outside the
Middle East region, finding promising new provinces in Alaska, the North Sea,
Mexico and elsewhere, many offshore. Also, nuclear energy was further
developed, and coal achieved a massive comeback in the electricity sector. The
oil companies released onto the market their reserves, which they had stored in
expectation of a potential future crisis. Also, programs for saving energy
displayed some success. In response to these developments, the Western
economies recovered from the oil price shocks of the 1970s and oil prices even
dropped significantly in the 1980s, down to a pre-crisis level of about US $9 a
barrel in January 1999.
But the crisis of the 1970s was not only about oil prices. There was a real
supply crisis. During the 1973 crisis the petroleum industry in the Middle East
was still predominantly113 based on vertically integrated supply chains. This
means that the oil industry controlled upstream as well as downstream
production and the power of supply was in the hands of the Western oil
companies.114 Horsnell explains:
(A) barrel lost in exports would be neatly matched by a barrel’s shortfall at the
buyer’s end. It was the world of what used to be called oil company supply
managers. Barrels were moved around the world like pieces on a chessboard, and
there was no other deus ex machina to mitigate or alter the impact of any shock.115
And it did not help that the system was still in the in the hands of Western oil
managers. During the 1973 crisis, Prime Minister Heath attempted to ask BP
and Royal/Dutch Shell for preferential treatment to deliver oil to Britain since
the British government held a majority shareholding. BP and Shell declined.116
After the oil crisis, the Middle Eastern states denationalized the Western
oil companies and in the mid 1970s ownership shifted to their own
governments. But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the oil world changed again
with the slow development of the international oil spot market. Today oil is
traded on these international spot markets, or in form of special contracts
between oil companies and refineries in certain countries. With this system in
place a state can always ultimately get the oil it wants, albeit at a much higher
price:
(T)he problem during a crisis was simply the price one has to pay…Even if all
one’s supplies were bought from countries that were not subject to disruption, once
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the short term scramble for barrels was over, one would be in no better a position
than a country which had all its imports subject to disruption. Securing the supply
lines was no longer the dominant issue it had had been in the early 1970s and
before.117
Thus, in the short- and mid-term perspective we will be spared the specter of a
reemergence of the 1970s’ oil crises, at least as long as we still have swing
producers who are capable of swiftly producing spare capacity to bring down
prices – a role which has always been played by Saudi-Arabia and other OPEC
countries. But, as some experts predict, after 2010 when the first effects of a
supply crisis become tangible, it will no longer be obvious as to which producer
can most easily compensate for the loss of barrels to act as a swing producer.
Maybe soon this role can be taken over by Iraq.
Vulnerability of Trade and Pipeline System
There remains the danger of a supply crisis caused by a disruption in the trade
and pipeline system. With 180 ships making the passage every day, the Suez
Canal is still an important trade route for Europe. Unimpeded passage through
the Canal is essential for European trade since it shortens the voyage from
Europe to the Indian Ocean by 10-12 days. But more critical in terms of
disruption is the Straits of Hormuz, with a movement of 18 mb/d, and without
any alternative export route for most of the oil. Therefore, the closure of
Hormuz would be “the absolute Armageddon scenario”118. With Al Qaeda
searching for opportunities to hurt the West in its most vulnerable points, such a
scenario no longer sounds unrealistic.
Europe’s critical gas supply from Algeria could also be subject to
disruption by attacks upon the onshore gas pipeline. This concern is bound to
increase in view of the growing role of gas. Two gas pipelines to Europe are
going through the potentially unstable Maghreb: one is the Transmed pipeline
carrying Algerian gas through Tunisia to Italy. The second, in operation since
1996, is the Maghreb-Europe pipeline. This nearly 800-mile pipeline transports
gas from Hassi R’Mel, the largest field in Algeria, through Morocco and below
the strait of Gibraltar to Seville in Spain, with expansions planned to Portugal,
France and Germany. In another scenario, Gulf and Mediterranean states with a
strong naval capacity would disrupt Europe’s trade and energy supply that is
transported on ships. Therefore, the US 5th and 6th Fleets’ explicit mission is--
among others--the protection of the energy supply.119 But what about the
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mechanism to deal with a supply crisis caused by a disruption in the trade or
pipeline system?
IEA Emergency Response
In the aftermath of the first oil crisis, the International Energy Agency (IEA)
was established in 1974 as part of the OECD, with the primary mission of
providing a mechanism to mitigate the effects of a future oil embargo by
Emergency Response Measures. Furthermore, the IEA was supposed to come
up with long-term plans to decrease dependency on OPEC, such as strategies of
diversification and conservation of supplies. The IEA also encouraged
international oil companies to ignore anti-trust laws in case of an oil shortage
crisis, since they were needed for cooperation with governments to distribute
the oil among the member countries in a fair and equitable fashion.
But the chief objective for the foundation of the IEA was energy security
and emergency response. To that end the IEA designed an integrated set of
emergency response measures, which include stockdraw, demand restraint,
fuel-switching, surge of oil production, and sharing of available supplies. This
Emergency Program goes into effect in case of international disruptions with a
7% loss of supply, called the “7% trigger”. In order to implement the stockdraw
measure in case of crisis, IEA member countries have committed themselves to
hold stocks equivalent to 90 days of net oil imports. The stockholding system
includes two types of stocks: company stocks, which are held by the industry
and government, and agency stocks, which are referred to as “public stocks”.
For EU members this obligation is reinforced by a EU commitment.120
These measures notwithstanding, in the second oil crisis in 1979, the IEA
failed. With a gross loss of 640 mb/d during the crisis, oil prices were driven
even higher than in the first oil crisis. The IEA failed to stop the dramatic surge
of oil prices. It was held responsible for not having curbed the catastrophic
dimension of the crisis. In particular, IEA’s reporting system was criticized for
its insufficient work.121
This changed with the Gulf War supply crisis in 1990-91, when the IEA
for the first time since its founding could refer to a successful management of a
crisis. Information flew better than in other crises and the market did not react
in panic but much more flexibly.122 Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait led the UN to
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impose an import embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil on August 6, 1990. This
embargo led to a shortfall of 4.3 million barrels of oil per day. An IEA
Contingency Plan was set up to provide for 2.5 million barrels of oil a day to be
made available to the market within 15 days, with 2 million coming from
strategic oil stocks.123 During this time, additional supplies came mostly from
Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers. Therefore it was not necessary to
evoke the Contingency Plan earlier than January 11, 1991. However, since
industry oil stocks were high at that time and oil demand was decreasing, only
about half of the strategic stock that had been offered by the United States and
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands was taken up.124 It was the US that
made the largest contribution by releasing 33.75 million barrels from the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Thus, it seemed that the Gulf War crisis
was not much of a challenge for the IEA to demonstrate its effectiveness:
enough spare capacity existed in the system to meet this shortfall in Kuwaiti and
Iraqi oil, and the stocks were filled at that time.
With the new heightened awareness on security of EU energy supplies,
the inadequacy of the IEA mechanism is in the focus of attention. The EU
Green Paper expresses skepticism about the IEA emergency program, while
blaming the EU members for a lack of commitment to release their reserves in
case of crisis:
During the Gulf War, as again today, it has been left to the US
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to spearhead pro-active intervention in
the oil markets…. (T)he experience of negotiations within the IEA
demonstrates that effective coordination and co-operation are extremely
difficult to achieve in practice. 125
The 2003 war against Iraq did not provide a chance for the IEA to prove
its effectiveness.
The EU Commission is aware of the insufficiency of existing EU
Community law on strategic reserves and seems determined to do something
about it. The EU Green paper suggests establishing a strategic oil reserve in
addition to the 90 days’ existing reserves for finished products126, and calls for
better Community mechanisms (such as centralized decision-making
mechanisms) for the release of oil to the market. Also, a new package of
measures to help to improve the security of energy supplies that was set up by
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the Commission in September 2002 points out a weakness in the IEA system:
member states’ stock management is linked to a large number of external
partners, such as Australia, Japan and Korea127, who do not have the same
priorities as the members with respect to the future EU integrated energy
market. As a response, the Commission suggests to harmonize the national
storage system and to coordinate the use of security stocks.
The EU’s incapacity to make decisions in this respect was demonstrated
boldly in September 2000, when an initiative of single member states failed to
follow the US example to jointly release strategic oil reserves to cool down
prices. The EU members were unable to agree on such a drastic initiative.128
5.2. US Geopolitics of Energy: All roads Lead Back to the Middle East
Since the 70’s oil crisis, energy supply security has been a salient constituent of
US foreign policy to be pursued by geopolitics.129 During the Cold War, the use
of military means for guaranteeing the supply of energy was legitimized by the
threat emanating from the Soviet Union, which was under constant suspicion of
seeking ways to restrict the West’s access to oil. Thus, the infamous “Carter
doctrine” of 1980 that declared the Persian Gulf as a region of “vital interests”
to the US was justified only by the anticipated advance of the Soviet Union
which, after its invasion into Afghanistan, had encroached closer to the Gulf
region. But the 1991 Gulf War was evidence that the threat of the Soviet Union
denying the West access to its lifelines had been used as a pretext and that, in
addition, after the end of the Cold War the US would not accept any
geopolitical changes in the Western-dominated petroleum system. Still, by
rallying the war alliance behind the US in the 1991 Gulf War, the argument of
the necessity for a restoration of international law by liberating Kuwait played
an important role. But it seems that with the distance of more than a decade, the
decisive motivation for this war can now be spelt out more explicitly: it was for
control of the region’s oil. Had Iraq not been defeated and instead occupied the
Kuwait oil fields, it would have controlled 20% of the region’s oil or some 6
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mb/d of capacity, turning it into an “ascendant power in OPEC”.130 Edward
Morse puts it boldly:
The Gulf War of 1991 was the first war in modern history fought
specifically over oil. It serves as a reminder that as long as hydrocarbon
resources remain fundamental to economic growth – and as long as there are
powerful governments that want to ensure access to hydrocarbon supplies –
there will be a commitment to use force to prevent any single government
from controlling the market.131
As Klare also demonstrates, US policy continues to consider access to
cheap oil as a national security issue far beyond the end of the Cold War and is
ready, if necessary, to use military force to secure it.132 This self-confidence in
the justification of US power projection for achieving US foreign policy goals is
displayed even by hard-core liberals such as Francis Fukuyama, who predicts
that oil will be one of three axes along which the North and the South will
collide militarily in the future. 133
The Democratic Clinton administration with its emphasis on economics
was no exception to this geopolitical approach to energy – in fact, even more so.
With an “economization of international security affairs”134 and the blending of
economics with national security135 the Clinton administration did not leave any
doubt that “the economic well-being of our society” constituted a national
security interest and was supposed to be defended – if necessary, by military
means.136 And security of energy supply is regarded as an essential constituent
of economic well-being. One expression of Clinton’s geopolitical approach to
energy was, for example, to declare Venezuela and Columbia as zones of “vital
American interests” because of their oil resources.137
The Republican Bush administration started with a strong focus on the
Persian Gulf as an area of strategic interests, as Condoleezza Rice spelt out at
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the beginning of her term as National Security Adviser.138 Accordingly, the
Bush administration’s May 2001 National Energy Policy mentioned that the
Gulf will “remain vital to U.S. interests”.139 But September 11, 2001, provoked
some short-term, though radical discontinuities with this strategy of focussing
on the Middle East. With the prospect of having to leave their Saudi base and
the fall-out in the long-term close and mutually beneficial relationship between
the Kingdom and the US, the Bush administration found itself at great pains to
downplay the significance of this loss of a strong ally in the Middle East. But
while the loss of the Saudi base has been compensated by new deployments in
other Gulf states, a reminder of Saudi power (as displayed by Crown Prince
Abdullah’s assurance that Saudi-Arabia is not considering the use of the oil
weapon as a means to withdraw US support from Israel) contributed to further
efforts by the US administration to dissipate the impression that the US is
dependent on Saudi or Middle Eastern oil. One effort to that end was to de-
emphasize the significance of the Middle East as a supplier for the US and
instead to emphasize the capacities and potential importance of the Caspian
region and Russia for US energy supplies.
With the opening up of the Caspian’s vast on- and off-shore oil fields
after the break-up of the Soviet Union, expectations were awakened about new
chances for the West to mitigate its dependency on oil supplies from the Middle
East. It was the USGS (US Geological Survey) that provided the first flawed
estimate of the fields as yielding as much as 200 billion barrels. But a variety of
new estimates corrected the USGS data and put the figure rather lower. Now, 10
years after the entry of foreign companies, the initial enthusiasm has
evaporated. While there are some promising fields, like the Tengiz field, where
Chevron is producing, and the discovery of new fields like the Kashagan field
of an estimated 20-25 billion barrels, the overall picture of disappointment
cannot be changed. BP and Statoil have even withdrawn from the Kashagan
venture since drilling there is very expensive, with deep oil at 4500m containing
as much as 16% sulfur.140 Azerbaijan has also turned out to be a
disappointment, with total findings of 2-5 billion barrels. Consequently, Exxon-
Mobil has now also withdrawn from Azerbaijan, turning the Baku-Ceyan
pipeline into an enterprise of questionable profit.141 With an estimated size of
about 61 billion barrels, the Caspian resources142 would be roughly comparable
to those of the North Sea, constituting about 6.1% of the global proven reserves.
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Accordingly, the verdict of a RAND Study remains that “the Caspian could
improve global energy security at the margins”.143
Probably in recognition of this less than encouraging data on the oil
reserves of the Caspian region and compensating for the loss of Saudi-Arabia,
Russia has been the card on which the US has been betting for its future energy
supply. It remains to be seen to what extent the US interest in Russia and
particularly in Russian-American energy development will fade when Iraq’s
vast oil fields will be finally under US control. Before Iraq had been turned into
a potentially non-OPEC country, Russia was desperately needed as the
replacement for the loss of the moderating power in OPEC, i.e., Saudi Arabia --
this time not within but outside of OPEC, a role Russia has played with sterling
diplomatic skills over the past winter. The close cooperation between both
countries in their fight against international terrorism is conveniently playing
into these plans. Analogously, US scholars and journalists supported the US
administration’s strategy to de-emphasize the role of the Middle East by arguing
that the US is actually not in need of Saudi oil. However, this argument is often
made by reiterating the mythical 200 billion barrel estimate for the Caspian
reservoir -- an estimate that has long since been refuted.144 In an April 2002
Foreign Affairs article on “The Battle for Energy Dominance”, referring to the
competition between Russia and Saudi Arabia in their role as energy suppliers
to the West, Edward Morse and James Richard145 argued that “the CIS has won
this competition because of its substantial reserves in the Caspian of about 75
billion barrels while Saudi Arabia displayed its incapability to increase its
production for the last 20 years”.146 But this lame comparison cannot ignore
what the authors concede at one point: that the Saudis’ share of supplies to the
US so far has been higher than that of any competitor147, and that in 2000 the
US imported 22.6% of its oil from the Middle East.
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energy exports and to the south, if Afghanistan emerges from the war as a stable international partner, fresh
prospects for a gas line leading across to Pakistan’s coast on the Arabian sea”. Quoted in Joseph Fitchett, “War
Alters Caspian Equation”, International Herald Tribune, October 30, 2001.
145 Morse and Richard, April 2002, p. 20.
146 With the “new environment of cooperation” after 9/11 and Russian corporate interests in Caspian countries,
Russia has ceased to encumber Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in building up their export pipelines. Ibid, p.26.
147 The authors indicate that roughly 1.7 mb/d of the roughly 10 mb/d imported into the US is supplied by Saudi-
Arabia.
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All Roads End in the Middle East
But notwithstanding all these attempts by the US elite to downplay Saudi
Arabia’s prominent role in the future energy market, the US administration is
going to face the inescapable reality that the US would have to come back to the
Middle Eastern countries, which are the world’s main suppliers of energy.
There is no dispute among the experts about which region offers the largest
quantities of oil reserves: the Middle East holds 65.3 % of the world’s proven
oil reserves. Accordingly, the share of worldwide oil coming from the Middle
East will increase again, rising from 26% in 1997 to 41% in 2020, thus
returning to early 1970s levels.148 Saudi Arabia has a special role since it holds
one-quarter of the estimated 1 trillion barrels of commercially proven
reserves.149 In a case of crisis, it would be Saudi Arabia more than any other
country that could easily and swiftly increase its oil production in a matter of
days. This refers to what has been labeled as “the strategic value of Saudi
Arabia to the US”, or the “swing producer role” of Saudi Arabia.
It remains to be seen to what extent regime change in Iraq has helped to
mitigate the problem of dependency on Saudi-Arabian oil. Nobody denies
seriously that the war against Iraq was about oil; in the war’s aftermath the
rationale for the war, Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass
destruction and links to Al Qaeda is collapsing. With the regime change in
Baghdad, international and, most of all, US oil companies regain access to
invest in Iraq’s vast oil fields which have been left almost untapped over the last
decade due to the UN sanction policy. It is estimated that Iraq possesses 112
billion barrels of oil, the largest reserve in the world outside Saudi-Arabia and
11% of proven reserves, almost double that of the Caspian. For years
international oil companies have been trying to gain access to the oil rich Gulf
region, but so far with success only for downstream production and without any
prospect for penetrating the attractive and profitable upstream production. In
addition, the US National Energy Strategy of May 2001 stressed the need for
US companies to invest in Middle East oil production and recommended “to
support initiatives by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Qatar, the UAE and other
suppliers to open up areas of their energy sectors to foreign investment”.150 The
authors of the Energy Strategy are certainly aware of the insincerity of this
recommendation since Saudi Arabia and the Kuwait parliament have made it
unmistakably clear that they are not going to repeat the mistake of the past by
                                                          
148 IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2001, p. 38.
149 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2001, p. 4.
150 Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy, Washington, May 2001,
p. 8-5.
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allowing the Western oil companies too much control of their precious
treasures. However, the regime change in Baghdad mitigates this impasse in the
international oil companies’ strategy to return to the Middle East by providing
access to a country with abundant cheap conventional on-shore oil that does not
exist anywhere else in the world.151 Thus, the oil companies believe they are
capable of keeping their promise of huge profits to their shareholders - which
include members of the Bush administration as well.152 But it remains to be seen
whether this scenario will unfold as planned and whether the Iraqi oil industry
will be capable of living up to the expectation of acting as a future swing
producer.153
European Geopolitics of Energy
While the US elite used to regard world oil as a strategic commodity, thus
treating energy as a foreign policy issue and consequently as a “national
security interest”, the European states usually preferred to pursue a policy of
free-riding and left it to the US to maintain and, if necessary, to restore the
geopolitical structure that guaranteed accessible and affordable oil to the West.
It remains to be seen now whether the strong opposition of some key EU states
against the US-led war in Iraq will signal a new and more radical rejection of a
geopolitical strategy to guarantee access to energy. Before the war in Iraq there
were the first, though disparate, signs that even in the EU Commission and EU
member states there are some officials and experts who think of a common and
European geopolitical approach as a solution to deal with the import
dependency of the EU. The first high-profile European to break the taboo of
requesting a European military contribution for dealing with energy supply
shortages was nobody less than the EU Director of the Mediterranean and
Middle East Department, Eberhard Rhein, when in a 1997 RAND study he
suggested:
The risk of another military conflagration in the Gulf region is more
difficult to assess and to cope with. It is evident that the EU will not be
capable, at least for another ten to fifteen years, of any preventive military
action in the Gulf or anywhere else in the world. When it comes to securing
energy supply by military power, the EU will not have any choice but to act
                                                          
151 The oil companies of two countries succeeded in gaining contracts under the Saddam regime: Elf and
TotalFina got contracts for two huge fields in the mid 1990s, but because of the trade embargo could not sign the
contracts. Saddam agreed to wait until the sanctions were lifted. The same conditions have applied for Russia’s
Lukoil which got a contract of another huge field in 1997. But in December 2002, Saddam annulled the contract
with Russia. This is the background for the accusations that Russia’s and France’s motives to oppose the war
were equally driven by interests in the Iraqi oil business. International Herald Tribune, March 7, 2003 and Der
Spiegel, No. 3, 2003, January 2003.
152 See Der Spiegel, January 13, 2002, (3/2003).
153 See ASPO Newsletter No. 24, December 2002.
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in union with the United States, either by way of bilateral coordination, as in
the Iraq war, or under NATO responsibility as in Bosnia.154
Additionally, the need to find a rationale for the plans of a European
Rapid Deployment Force has contributed to the development of a distinct
European geopolitical approach to energy. The government-funded Clingendael
Security Institute in the Netherlands identified “essential interests” for Europe,
such as a mass exodus of refugees or “hostile groups violently interrupting the
flow of raw materials and/or indispensable commodities from areas Europeans
are heavily dependent on”.155 In the context of asserting that the Middle East
and Gulf are “strategically and economically essential to Europe’s future”,156
the authors furthermore support a French suggestion to establish a special rapid
reaction force for “crisis management” in the Mediterranean. But they leave
unmentioned that such a force, with a projected deployment area for the
Mediterranean, has been in existence since 1995, though with the participation
of only four Southern EU members.
EU Geopolitics: Operational European Maritime Forces
On the EU level, as early as 1995 and in context of the Barcelona process, a
European Maritime Force with the Mediterranean as a deployment area took
shape when Spain, France, Italy and Portugal set up a rapid operation land force
and a maritime force, called EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.157 Their task is
the implementation of the WEU Petersberg missions158, including
peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and evacuation of European citizens. Not
surprisingly, the Southern Mediterranean countries, which were not consulted
or informed beforehand, had strong reservations against the establishment of
this force as “nothing other than intervention on the southern shore of the
Mediterranean”.159 Also, Western strategists drew attention to the imprecision
with which potential missions are projected for the newly formed forces.160 If
peacekeeping is the predominant mission of these forces, then why not design a
                                                          
154 Eberhard Rhein, 1997, p. 56. In 2002, Rhein, now based at the European Policy Centre, advocates strongly a
transition to renewable energies as a solution. See Rhein, 2002.
155 von Staden et al., 2000, p. 28.
156 Ibid, p. 29.
157 For more details, see Informationen für die Truppe, 1/99. EUROMARFOR encompasses an aircraft carrier,
three destroyers, three amphibious landing ships, seven frigates, four mine hunters, two support ships, two
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159 Faria and Vasoncelos, p. 11.
160 See, for example, Spencer.
40
force which could intervene in the crisis-stricken sub-Saharan regions of Africa
instead of in North Africa? In its maneuvers, EUROMARFOR predominantly
seemed to practice the rescue of EU nationals. But it is also possible that these
forces could be used for other kinds of missions, such as interventions in the
context of a potential wave of sea-borne refugees or for the security of energy
supply. A scenario in this context is a fundamentalist take-over in Algeria in
which EUROMARFOR could be employed to restore the security of the
pipeline system.
The plans for EUROMARFOR correspond with an idea circulating in the
strategic community about a geographical division of labor within NATO for
areas which are of more importance to either of both transatlantic partners: it
suggests that Africa and the Balkans would fall under European responsibility
and the US’s role would be to maintain the status quo in the Persian Gulf.161
While critics warn that this plan for a division of labor could undermine
NATO’s effectiveness as an organization, this does not matter too much
anymore in view of NATO’s current lapse into insignificance.
6. CONCLUSION
The post-Cold War period witnessed the occurrence of two wars in which
access to resources played a considerable role. The notion of a “resource war” is
not new: the latest oil crises of the 1970s sharpened the North’s awareness of its
dependencies on the resources of the South and the necessity for “resource
management” to avoid conflicts between the producer and consumer countries.
But in the course of the 1980s, with the success of the West’s subsequent
diversification strategy, which provided cheap oil from reliable partners,
concern for resource wars died down.
Furthermore, post-Cold War international relations theories are not well
suited to explain the phenomenon of “resource conflicts” and to engage in
analysis for their prevention. This applies to the mainstream theories of neo-
liberal institutionalism and neo-realism, the former because it believes that by
the positive effects of globalization conflict, as the dominant feature of the
international system, will be eradicated, the latter because with its focus on the
status quo rather than change neo-realism is more prone to provide subsequent
justifications of “resource wars” than useful explanations of how to avoid them.
Also the more marginal and radical theories are no exception to this
observation, since they continue social science’s tradition of not recognizing
“nature” as a factor in determining social outcomes. Also, international
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relation’s subfield of “environmental conflict and security” focuses on
environmental degradation and renewable resources as motives for future
domestic conflict, while neglecting the conflict potential of non-renewable
resources for triggering war between states. However, with the growing energy
import dependency of several states and a future oil supply crisis emerging on
the horizon, attention must re-shift again on the inter-state level, and re-focus on
non-renewable resources as the cause of potential conflict.
However, the West cannot depend on its strategies to prevent and manage
this type of conflict - risk reduction, crisis management and geopolitics of
energy - since they are at most only effective in the short- and mid-term, and are
inadequate in the long term. The “risk reduction” strategy of the EU, which puts
all of its eggs into a single Russian basket, will not help to reduce the risk of
potential supply crisis. With Russia’s indefinite suspension of the Energy
Charter Treaty’s ratification process, the EU will not have an instrument to deal
with an energy supply interruption involving one of its most important
suppliers. The conflict management strategies of the IEA will also have only
marginal impact in mitigating and de-escalating these crises. In the Gulf War it
was the swing producers, not the IEA, who quickly took the heat out of these
situations by producing spare capacity. The third strategy, a geopolitics of
energy, has been pursued so far only by the US, and encompasses a
comprehensive approach of projecting power into energy-rich regions, ranging
from military deployments with the consent of the host country or the use of the
military to control an energy-rich region. But such a geopolitical approach,
which so far has been pursued in the predominantly Islamic Middle East, is
counterproductive in the longer run, since it produces antagonism between oil-
rich Islamic states and oil-import dependent Western states.
It is highly probable that any preliminary considerations to copy a US
geopolitics of energy, either by developing a distinctive EU geopolitical
approach, or by planning to participate in US geopolitical operations, have
come to a full stop with the war against Iraq. After the shock of fully grasping
the implications of a “US geopolitics of energy” the EU might now be more
willing to turn to alternative innovative strategies for avoiding conflict over
resources. One such strategy is to conserve energy by means of taxation and
legislation, as well as by dedicating resources to the research and development
of alternative energy. Even if solar technology creates new dependencies on
sun-rich countries, this will not have the dimensions of a fossil-fuel dependency
for the simple fact that the energy of the sun is not subject to a depletion
process. Another strategy would be to search for new avenues within the
framework of the UN by initiating a dialogue between producer and consumer
countries in order to arrive at a more equitable distribution of energy. A
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determined pursuit of these alternative approaches might still have a chance to
delay or prevent the occurrence of the anticipated supply crisis. However, when
the effects of global decline of oil production become visible after 2010, when
an increasing number of countries have to import an increasing number of fossil
fuels, it will be difficult to avoid conflicts over the distribution of this
invaluable and indispensable resource. And the axis along which these conflicts
will erupt will be that of consumers and producers of energy, with most
producers of energy belonging to the South.
Susanne Peters
Political Science Department
Giessen University
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